Audio: (Translator speaks) On behalf of the State Council I now present to you my report on the work of the government for your deliberation and approval. The year of 2008 was eventful. Our country’s economic and social development withstood severe challenges and tests.

Asia2025: Welcome back to Asia2025.

The National Peoples Congress kicks off with economic stability at the forefront, Tibet in the background and as of this week, North Korea and missiles somewhere in the middle. Can China keep it together and reach eight percent growth?

Is the United States to blame for China’s woes?

We’ll discuss this and the strategic imperatives weighing on China this week on Asia2025.

Another incredible week if you are a China follower and in this program it is hard to know where to start.

But let’s start with what the Chinese Premier in the opening address at the National Peoples Congress called the strategic objective this year for the country -that is economic growth.

It’s a subject that dominates all discussions and interviews over here, whether China is in a recession, whether it can survive the downturn and what to do with 20 million unemployed migrant workers and whether it will reach its eight percent target growth.

With the National Peoples Congress opening in Beijing, the Premier, Wen Jiabao, in his address called the Work Report that is similar to the State of the Union, outlined the details of China’s budget and plan for the next year and just what the four trillion Yuen stimulus package will deliver.

Of course a lot of the money will be going into stimulating domestic demand and major infrastructure projects with a $950 billion deficit this year to deal with the financial crisis.

There has also been a press conference by the Chinese Foreign Minister in which he discussed threat assessments and national security. Interestingly, he talked about the move from traditional geopolitical threats to non-traditional areas such as financial security, climate change and food security.

He said that China now had a 'strategic' opportunity.

I’m not so sure about that but I do know that when the Chinese President meets Barak Obama at the G20 meeting in London, there will be a lot to talk about including North Korea’s threat to launch a long range missile. It’s a response it would seem to joint military exercises by South Korea and the United States that end March 30th.

I cannot impress upon you enough how serious the situation is in the country at the moment and there is no denying that this is a crucial time for China as the Foreign Minister stated, China having to deal with non-traditional threats, read the economy, read disasters and climate change.

As well, we have the lingering issue of Tibet, the Western Provinces and most recently, the auction of Chinese artefacts by the French house, Christies, which caused such a stir over here and let to a successful fake bid by a Chinese art collector.

The rhetoric was here that the international world was stealing Chinese treasures, this being another French humiliation endured by the Chinese, and there are a lot of comparisons to the burning of the Summer Palace by British and French forces in 1860. I have always emphasised the history here on this program so I think that is really worth mentioning.

Today I interview Shi Yinhong, currently Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for American Studies at Renmin University in Beijing. He was also President of the American Historical Research Association of China from 1996 to 2002.

He has written many, many books including: The History of Modern International Relations from the 16th Century to the end of the 20th Century, International Politics and Statecraft, World Politics and China’s Strategy for the Early 21st Century, a Collection of Studies, among many, many others.

We caught up on the first day of the National Peoples Congress and he had a lot to say about US-China relations and the strategic reality today.

He has in the past spoke of the increase in strategic tensions between the two powers and as an historian of the Cold War I was interested in his view of events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and more recently the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia.

I will add this interview is part of my China Conversations series so it is a bit longer than the normal program.

I began by asking Shi Yinhong whether we are seeing strategic tensions rising today....

SY: If you mean is not is a Cold War, but I mean the cold power rivalry, and even intensive rivalry. And I cannot assure that there is absolutely no possibly that China and United States in future and will not have this kind tension.

I think that strictly speaking you find a very interesting fundamental phenomenon. On one had the cooperation and economic and financial and security even, interdependence between two countries, between China and United States dramatically increasing, every year, every decades.

But on the other hand at the same time and the structural rivalry on economical front and the security front and in some ... this is American preference for ideological front, I think that the great power rivalry between our two countries at same time become more profound.

I’m not saying that more intense now, but more profound.

And so I think that the future is still, you know, depends on our choice on both sides. If we want, if we do enough efforts, we can reduce this kind of future superpower rivalry to a minimum degree. But if we assessed our own national interests on both side and if we look more at the past and at the present, then looking at the future.

And if we have a stupid diplomacy and too much of an aggressive strategy, I think that there is still possibly that in the future and China and United States has some possibility to have rivalry, as great powers. Although without major war between them.

Asia2025: That’s very interesting because obviously it was announced today as well that there’s a 14.9% increase in the military budget in China, that’s 70 billion set aside.

If there is a 14.9% increase in the military budget it means that it’s (leader’s) are not really thinking that we’re moving into sort of peaceful or non-threatening times.

What’s your response to this?

SY: I think China’s military build up escalating every year. Every year defence budgets rise into two digits and this is one of the most divisive issues between China and the West. And you cannot find another area where China’s perception and the Western perception are so divisive.

And China thinks that we’re peaceful. Our intention shall not be [unclear] and our capability in military front is still far from, you know, some small percentage of United States military capability.

And especially that China believes its intention to be very much peaceful. But unfortunately this is not a Western point of view. And the Western, whether by their learning of their own history and of international relations, and their beliefs and I think that they put more emphasis on capability. And they think we cannot believe anyone’s self-intention because intention is dynamic. And they put emphasis on capability.

So you know there is intense contradiction - on one side they obsessed with their own intention. And other side is obsessed with other side’s capability. And of course behind this is on both sides is some strategic suspicion, and very profound.

And also in domestic politics - in China you can find that 99% of the public in principle, very strongly support governments and the build up for military capability.

And United States side, on Western side of course they also have domestic backgrounds that make governments have to suspicion toward China’s military build up.

So I think that I don’t want to repeat China’s arguments again. And, but I still think that China’s intention now is very peaceful. And tomorrow it can be like this. But day after tomorrow, of course, if I say that we will be forever peaceful intended, the Western audience will not agree with me.

So I think that China’s past three decade’s experience is to pay national number one attention to economic development, to foreign trade. And they wing it. And they have a lot of benefits from it.

And so I believe that this kind of experience is much more important than China, you know, they think about their military capability and the military use.

Asia2025: Do you think though, the peaceful coexistence with the West is possible?

I mean let’s talk about the history. History still lingers so importantly for the Chinese.
They believe that they were badly treated in Versailles, the Opium wars, the Russian betrayal in the 20th Century.

Do you think that China will ever be able to peacefully co-exist with the West, especially as there is a lot of pressure on China at the moment?

SY: If we talk about the minimum peaceful coexistence, I believe it because this is the nuclear age. And I don’t think that any great power dare to or want to have some major war that can so easily escalate to nuclear conflict.

And also the economic things, financials and that globalisation have stronger influence than in the past historical period.

But peaceful coexistence, you have two kind of peace: Cold Peace or Hot Peace. Cold peace is minimum coexistence. I think that nuclear weapons and other changes of the major changes of the world assure it.

But if you want to have, you know, some peace and better than cold peace and have, not only have some common interests to avoid the nuclear threats but also some common interest to have a better future.

And also if you can’t develop some, the friendly feelings and not love but friendly feelings between great powers, then I think this is still a great task and for all people and all governments of those great powers. And I think our situation is much better than it was before in 1945. And also much better there before, than the Soviet American Cold War years.

But still I think that there is possibility that in future great powers still have some chance to become, you know, the protracted rivals without major war.

Asia2025: Well I mean the problem is though that China has found it in the past to develop relationships with outside powers because of its history, because of its suspicions.

And Harry Harding has said China fears ‘strategic dependence and economic exploitation’. Can China overcome its suspicions, especially considering the events of last year?

We had activity, we had protests in Tibet, we had pressure on its western flank, we had the human rights demonstrations; we had talk of it being a currency manipulator, the financial crisis, also attempts to decrease China’s influence in the UN.

I mean things are not easy for China at the moment and while China may seek stability, in the last year the most difficult of years it didn’t get it.

SY: There is still possibility that China’s, you know, between China and West, the strategic suspicions, ideological suspicions and even economic friction and rivalry will become more intense especially if you consider that now there is a global recession and financial crisis.

And everyone of course speaks more about international cooperation. But in fact everyone do a little, more than before, self-regarded actions. And so I think that in this kind of situation and also if China you know, doesn’t seriously address its own huge problems in social injustice, environmental deterioration and unbalanced economical development, then in Western eyes China will become maybe a little more dangerous than before, not only for military powers but also for China’s own healthy economic development.

Also in China’s eyes, if the United States still financially at least, so selfish and still not responsible enough to get their own economic house in good order. Or so often the American politicians and European politicians they focus too much on some issue that China cannot accept for is own development. And human rights, if they blah blah they speak every day, every hour.

I think after this kind of not only strategic and economic suspicion but whole of the feelings toward each other will deteriorate. So although we have a lot of, you know, advantage conditions now between China and the West, but still there are some major points which if both sides not deal with so carefully, not so responsibly, I think that I cannot assure that in the future relations between China and the West will be necessarily better than now and before.

Asia2025: Well I mean what was really interesting was the Premier addressing the National People’s Congress this morning saying boosting domestic demand was a strategic principle.

And I spoke to Shen Dingli last week and he said China would survive, you know, without American investment and economic support. He said, you know, basically we can survive on our own and we’ll work it out.

But the problem is America can also ... I’m thinking of the economic interdependence, America can get cheap goods from India. There’s been the endless promotion of India as the new China that of course, helps America strategically. So America’s been developing its options to the China production house.

How can China survive, and I mean what are China’s real options in a climate of reduced economic growth which has been the plank of Chinese power, I guess?

SY: I think that I have not read our Premier’s speech, but I think that if you talk about survival, if China can survive without outside world, I think this is a great overstatement. And by proving is not survival. Everyone want to, you know, have a life at least a little better than survival. And China of course can survive without anyone.

But China it wants to have a much better life and even to sustain economic growth. I think that outside world market, capital and raw material is vital, still vital in part. But of course now global recession, everyone have to, you know, depend on themselves a little more or much more than before that recession. And of course the China economy goes down because of the export market is shrinking.

And so China, what is China’s you know, the approach China should take? This is to change, transform our health development pattern which depends too much on, you know, export or especially labour intensive merchandise. Too much on foreign markets including US and Europe markets, and pay too little attention to explore the domestic market to have more balance, to let people have more power within this country to produce, to buy their own merchandise.

And of course this is very hard task. And partly because in the past almost 20 decades this problem existed. And if you want to stop this most fundamental problem, you need time. But the global recession gave us a clear warning that we haven’t got enough time.

So I think that the whole of the China, including China’s government and public should in bad time and hard time to pay much more attention to the transformation of the pattern of development and to reduce substantially our health too much independence upon outside world market and capital.

Asia2025: When did historically - when did relations between America and China turn that corner?

I guess what I’m talking about here is there was Nixon’s visit in the ‘70s. US and China were working together more as partners certainly at sort of hedging against the USSR. When did it change? When did China and America start to look at each other a little bit more suspiciously?

And I’m wondering whether or not it had anything to do, you know, because we had the, in the 1980s when China really went, forayed... decided to go out into the world, into the Middle East? When did the relationship change?

SY: I think this is a gradual process. I cannot say that in this year, this year it changed. But generally, you know, the immediate change of Soviet foreign policy and then collapse of the Soviet Union, of course to dramatically reduce the so-called common strategy factor, Soviet factor in Sino-American relations. And so it was necessary that other factors, good or bad were to become more prominent.

And I think that of course what was happening in 1989 is big events. And before that I think that the Taiwan issue and non-proliferation and the suspected Chinese missile technology export to the Middle East, arms control and all of those things are quite, you know, hot disputes.

And I think after 1989 and the civil pass over difficult times and Deng Xiaoping go to his [unclear] and China dramatically rising economically, then you found that the dispute points partly changed and the trade disputes become more and more prominent. And human rights and the problems become more prominent. And Tibet and so and so and then, you know, military, you know, Chinese military build up become disputed points.

But at the same time most countries never have before so much economic interdependence and financial independence and also more and more broadly select to strategic cooperation to deal with Iran, to deal with North Korea and so, cooperation but also without disagreements even these complicated issues.

And so today’s Sino-American relations, I think that have one of the greatest changes in Sino-American relations in the years you just lived, that is complexity.

Asia2025: Well I mean yes, but let’s go back to the fall of the Berlin Wall because, you know, it’s very interesting the ramifications for China.

I mean it really meant that one player in the strategic triangle was now under a lot more pressure. You know, Russia was suddenly out of the game. And the ideological tenets I guess of communism were then questioned as the wall came down.

And it also complicated China’s decision making, didn’t it? For example there were suddenly all these regional actors that you had to deal with which were formally under the Soviet umbrella, so I’m talking about Central Asia.

So that really complicated and brought forward many challenges for Chinese diplomacy.

SY: I think that China diplomacy in a way is, you know, products of China’s domestic approach. I think that dramatic change happen when Soviet Union collapse and when Eastern Europe is changed, where the United States is so, you know, self complacent, you know ‘The End of History’.

And at that time in China I think that what happened in 1989 and I think this is the hardest time for Deng Xiaoping. And this is hardest time for Chinese Communist Party. But their strategic performance is broadened now, we can say, and more so in these hard days because they take China as the overwhelming concern. And they do their own work well. And they take very prudent foreign policy, they focus their attention on the Chinese domestic economic development.

And during this process China is wise, but the United States because they think the ‘End Of History’, because they think that the world become much, much more easier, so they use money so easily. They send their troops to Iraq and during this process China do their own work. And foreign policy reflects the foreign policies that are generally very prudent with selective activity. The United States picture is different.

So the result up to today is the people in the world say that Chinese rise and the United States is relatively decline.

So I think that the Deng Xiaoping and his associates strategic performance generally in the hardest time is so brilliant. And more than that, and in 1992 Deng Xiaoping launch the Chinese largest scale market economy reform and economy growth.

And so in the past three decades you always think that ... you always can see that China leaders and Chinese government are generally inward looking. They pay their attention to their own house. And if they think that we have some capability and interest and resources, they do selective work in foreign policy to very carefully and very, almost naturally to expand China economically specially, and also political influence in the world.

And this is I think that the classic case of when people, when in very difficult situation and they pass over and they become successful. And this is a classical strategic performance. Of course in this process we leave also many problems and some are very new, very major.

But most of them are domestic. Not in foreign policy.

Asia2025: You’re listening to Asia2025 and we’re talking to Shi Yinhong about strategic competition between the United States and China.

Asia2025: But what about the forays of America into the Balkans and Kosovo and the two Iraq wars? I would have thought they were telegraphing some ...military superiority on behalf of the United States, no?

I mean surely those wars, especially with the bombing of the Serbian embassy, Chinese embassy, had implications for China.

SY: I think of course, this kind of action, especially NATO intervention in Kosovo and bombing of Chinese embassy, and these two things I think are most prominent and at that time shocked China leaders and the Chinese elite opinion and even public.

And of course during a few months maybe this kind of events maybe you have some too bleak assessment of world situation and US strategic environment.

But this is very temporary. And I think that only ... I remember only after two months China rested on our calmness, China rested on what Deng Xiaoping, what he thought of the world and China in the hardest time.

So China generally did not make any over reaction.

Asia2025: I know, but what was the implication for China, not what was the reaction, but what was the implication for China?

SY: The implication.

Asia2025: For China.

SY: I think that of course you can over estimate its implication. If you think that this is so serious then you will think that today there is Kosovo and next day they will move to Chinese front. And so I think that generally and so, you know, there was intimate discussion and even debate, and very quickly China make the appropriate implication.

This means that and you should to pay some attention to strategic ‘rear guarding’ but not too much. And still you do your homework well to develop your economy, to develop your foreign trade and don’t, you know, to be diverted by this kind of action. I think that our assessment, our government assessment is correct at the time and I think that is part of the many Chinese scholars including me, we want in this country to have this kind of calm assessment.

Asia2025: Right. You’re saying if China was provoked, it wasn’t provoked enough to do anything rash?

SY: Definitely.

Asia2025: Do you think China has enough international allies in the international arena at the moment?

Because the West has put pressure on China’s weak spots and in fact many of the countries that are singled out in the war on terror are countries that have good relations with China. So North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Pakistan.

And of course you also have a Japan and many of your neighbours on your doorstep but in particular Japan who is increasing its rhetoric against China.

SY: I think that if you talk about alliance, of course China have no alliance generally except that cannot abandon alliance because legal constraints with the North Korea. But its substance has changed. And I think that China now is generally, you know, exactly is non-aligned country. And of course, and we have also called the number strategic partnerships with many, many other countries. And this has given us much more flexibility. And this has given us, the much less possibility.... to force us to make commitment and to support for anyway some mistaken or bad behaviour of the weak partner.

And so this is our mainstream foreign, relationship that is strategic partnership. But of course there is a cost.

An alliance is practical. An alliance means that generally whether, you know, what kind of situation you can generally expect support even military assistance from your allies. And strategic partnership is flexible, but not practical. And very much flexible but often, have a lot of subsequent changes. You deal with troubles, you can expect some major problems, but you cannot expect your partnership taken for granted will support you.

And so looking to the future, and I still doubt that if China wants to have legitimate great power interest in next, for example, 30 years it still doesn’t need any alliance. So I think that alliance system is great burden for United States now, but it also at same time, brings a lot of benefits.

Asia2025: I want to talk about soft power.

How important do you think has that been, other people using that or other powers using that as pressure on China and the soft powers I mean human rights, environment, financial levers. If I was to be very clever I would call them ‘asymmetrical’ threats.

But I guess I wanted to know your view of these soft power issues.

SY: I think soft power is a soft concept. It’s very broad. You should differentiate the different kinds of soft power. Some soft power is most fundamental, decisive. And some soft power is secondary, even not so significant.

Asia2025: For example?

SY: And the greatest soft power is your own ... is the health of your own society.

And if you have a healthy society, you can inspire your own people. You can attract other people. And so I think that both United States and China are not good in this greatest soft power. And the US situation you know, and China we have a lot of, you know, very fundamental environment and social justice and unbalanced economic development, social development problems. Of course, secondary soft power, of course you can more immediate and if you can pressure China’s human rights, sometimes maybe we help the West.

But I don’t think that it’s has a great use and the past 20 or 30 years prove it.

And also you have the power and if you have... I define Chinese diplomacy generally as a smart diplomacy, good manners and soft style. Now this is useful but of course this is not decisive. And of course, and cultural. I don’t think that any Asian cultural is very directly useful in this contemporary culture. But culture should have some background.

Everyone, most of the people in the world think that Hollywood film is generally good, or Coca-Cola is good drink. But if United States have very, very bad foreign policy, especially if United States now in such kind of irresponsible financial turmoil and hurt every others, I don’t think that the pure cultural factors will help a nation a lot.

So I think that every soft power, big or small, is important. But most decisive issue, and much, much more overwhelming, more important than any other power is the health of your own society. And if you depend on that, even you are still good in diplomacy, you still can win over people.

Asia2025: Well it’s interesting that you say that because I want to come to the issue of you know there’s all this talk of Confucianism in Chinese society at the moment, you know, sort of as ideology receding these sort of things are coming to the fore.

And often this talk of morality, of China behaving like a principled international actor, the Chinese stressing the importance of morals, etc.

But if history has taught China anything, hasn’t it taught China that it has to be powerful, that there’s no virtue in weakness?

SY: I think that the people of course come from history. History subconsciously is very important but I don’t think that people conscious to depend on history so much. And why people think that history is good and Confucianism is good or something just like that, because it should be compatible with your contemporary experience.

And what is important in Confucianism generally is not its morals. I don’t think that China have generally, especially in domestic situation, have a high moral standards and high moral player. But Confucianism pays much more attention to influence rather than forces. And it teaches people don’t be obsessed with forces. And you should use other resources, you should be patient, you should gradually win with substance rather than some conquest. And I think that of course this is comparable with Asian Chinese empires experience.

But this kind of doctrine, or this kind of teaching, or this kind of indirect heritage is just compatible with what we China, what Deng Xiaoping found in later 1970 and early 1980s. And this strengthened our case, this strengthened our determination to be patient, to rely much, much less on military power and rely on, you know, domestic construction.

And of course now, it is more compatible because Confucianism says that soft things morality and the social organisation and harmonious social structure and feeling is more important even than your wealth, than your GDPs and your foreign trade. I think that this is comparable with our sense of our problem and searching for the right direction.

So I think that it now has more appeal in China than five years ago, 10 years ago.

Asia2025: Well I want to raise something David Lampton raises, in which he talks about the issue of whether or not people believe China’s simply complying to international norms to derive tactical benefits until they no longer serve PRC interests.

I’m talking about a sort of general overview of well is China playing the nice game until its interests, it decides it really no longer has to play the game.

Now, I just want to bring up one example which didn’t help this week and that was the recent fake bid on two Chinese artefacts. The idea being well there we go, here’s an example of someone who claimed to be working within an international norm and then changed the rules and said no, it was a fake bid.

SY: I think partly this is possible because I think that China benefited a lot from globalisation.

And we still lack the international experience and enough motivation. And so you see same things just like in the 19th Century. And but China’s situation is better than United States in 19th Century. At that time they had isolationism. And now we had, you know, not so sufficient international responsibility. And the Chinese government already in most of the years have said again and again we will increase our bearing of international responsibility because we benefited from this world and because we have more increased capabilities than before.

But on the other hand I don’t think that the statement you quoted is not biased. And I don’t think that China’s huge amounts, even now, months after months, buying off US national debts, is not building most importantly, responsibility in this world.

Maybe building too much. It’s now a complaint within China - even economists say this.

And also China also - you know, it almost has no direct bearing upon us - but we support US anti-terror war. And we give support to US efforts to deal with Iran and approach with [unclear] is always correct.

Of course climate change, and I don’t think that it’s only China’s issue. It’s Indian’s issue and responsibility is reciprocal. China should increase our commitment to climate change. But the United States – Europe is better - but United States should also do very much.

And also the international norms are not fixed. And these international norms, you know, consulting with developing countries when they are poor, when they are weak, are so lax. And I think that we should take dynamic point of view and we should, every country should perform international norms but in this process consult on ways to improve international norms. And much dramatic - always international norms - especially on the financial front.........

Asia2025: Let’s talk about North Korea because June Teufel Dreyer spoke at length about North Korea, and ideas that China has a real fear it could collapse.

Of course strategically that would be a disaster for China. It’s an important buffer for the country. You yourself have said ‘for China nowadays, North Korea is important for strategic, not ideological reasons’.

Is North Korea a situation that worries Beijing? And what are China’s options?

SY: My government have not told me what they think but I guess they are very worried, have great worry, great anxiety. But not strategic.

The minimum - human condition and stability, and for minimum stable command. And China will instantly face almost millions of refugees. And we have no, you know, the land mines to protect ... to prevent them. We cannot use machine guns and they will not take their grave risk of life to cross the DMZ. They will cross the Yalu.

And so I think that this is minimum and almost the most important consideration. Of course also, and if you consider the history of Korean Peninsula, and if there is, you know, internal weakness and instability and it has some possibility that a great power will unconsciously or consciously take this as a military struggle.

And so generally speaking I think that China have thoroughly a legitimate worry about the stability of North Korea. And so I think that it increases the case for people to understand China’s behaviour over this complicated issue.

But of course I personally hope that Chinese government can clarify ... rather than always confused, always tested, always in dilemma, and sometimes they should do some clear action.

Asia2025: Well what sort of clear action are you talking about here?

SY: Clear action depends on situation. If North Korea humiliates China too much, because they do some things too harmful to China, I think that we have no need to be as patient as today.

Of course still at the time we still should do our best, if possible, to keep a minimum reasonable relation with North Korea and to, you know, not to aid the conditions to aggravate their disagreements with our country because it will hurt China’s vital interests.

Asia2025: My last question: do you think China can stand up as Mao would have wanted, to fill its dream of historical greatness? Nationalism is still a very important virtue in the country. It was a first principle of Sun Yat-sen’s three principles. So do you think China can fulfil its desire for historical greatness?

SY: I think nationalism is very complicated thing.

Generally speaking, you know, a great power nation has three possible futures.

One is nationally go to extreme, and it produced a most ugly picture in world history in the 20th Century. And China will not do that.

And second, the nationalism is where you weak you have less self-confidence. So at that time, the nationalism is often very sharp and very militant. But when you become more powerful and will have more, you know, constructive relation with the world, and when you’re satisfied with yourself and that kind of nationalism will become more and more liberal. And finally you forget that this is nationalism.

And of course the last possibility for group our nation is to the ... that because of the past combined with the present and future, so you have some self-contradictory process. And in one part you are still sometimes too nervous, sometimes too militant internationally but gradually at the same time you become more and more self-confident.

I believe China will go the third road.

And I think that if China can effectively interaction our planned domestic program and to make more balance social development, and to have general social justice with still relatively high economic growth. And also if we can protect our water and air and land in good, I think that China maybe not use so much time then people expect to in the past or even today, China will become one of the greatest nations in the world, one of the most powerful, but one of the ... have the most widespread, the good relationship with others.

And at the same time Chinese people will on the one hand become much more self-confident than now. And other side will become more liberal and more open minded, more think of their own force or weaknesses and not to raise too much demanding demands to others.

And I think that maybe China have 1.3 billion people, if this world will become better, then this is China’s destiny to become a good, powerful but nice and responsible great power.

Asia2025: Thanks so much for your time.

Asia2025: And that was Shi Yinhong, currently Professor of International Relations, and the Director of the Centre for American Studies at Remnin University in Beijing.

You can view the Chinese perspective of events today in China via the China Daily or CCTV9.

So if you put in CCTV9.com/english in your browser you’re going to hear some really interesting views.

That’s it for me this week. Thanks for listening. Have a good week.